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On May 27, 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government completed the full five-year 
term in office. Although part of a coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which 
includes regional parties, this was the first majority party government in India since 1984. 
Led by the charismatic Narendra Modi, the BJP came to power on an anti-corruption wave 
against the Congress administration and with a promise of a new development programme for 
India’s youth. Before 2014, Hindu nationalist parties had struggled to capture more than a 
quarter of the electorate’s votes, but the BJP  crossed this threshold securing 31 per cent, 
shattering the long-held presumption that an ideological party was incompatible with the  
centrist nature of India’s democracy.  This breakthrough, as we shall see below, was followed 
by the implementation of policies promoting Hindutva (Hinduness) that have brought into 
prominence the cultural politics of Bharat – an India that has until now remained 
marginalised. As the BJP and its allies begin a second term in office, it is appropriate to 
reflect on the experience of Hindu nationalism in government. 
 
 Most assessments of a government’s record in administration focus on the evaluation 
of manifesto policies against actual achievements. Sáez and Singh (2012), for example, 
provide a systematic assessment of the first United Progressive Alliance government (2004-
09), covering aspects of domestic and foreign policies, with a special emphasis on state 
secularism, religious minorities and ethnic conflict. Such an appraisal of the BJP-led NDA 
government is problematic for two reasons. First, insufficient time has elapsed for us to 
undertake a rigorous review of the government’s policies which include, not least, the 
difficulties researchers have encountered in critically engaging with the administration itself. i
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Second, in reviewing what is potentially a transformative government there is need to move 
beyond evaluatory frameworks of public policy to a more interpretive understanding that 
reflects the seismic changes in Indian politics today.  
 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive account of the BJP-
led NDA government’s policies, but rather to contribute to how we can better comprehend 
the experience of Hindu nationalism in power. The first section of the paper therefore maps 
the broad narrative of the BJP in office, outlining some key developments. The second 
section, in contrast, offers an overview of the competing approaches through which these 
developments have been framed. For reasons outlined above, any assessment at this stage by 
its very nature must remain provisional. This preliminary exercise therefore is offered as a 
contribution to the greater effort that will be necessary for more conceptual and 
methodological clarity to evaluate what is evidently a new phase in the history of India’s 
democracy.   
 
Hindu nationalism in government: an overview 
On February 14, 2019, a convoy of security personnel in Pulwama, Kashmir, was attacked by 
a suicide bomber killing 40 members of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force. The attack 
was claimed by militants operating from Pakistan who had been instrumental in a series of 
audacious terrorist acts on Indian security forces since 2016. The Pulwama incident was 
followed on February 26 by a coordinated strike by the Indian Airforce on a militant base in 
Balakot across the Line of Control (BBC, February 26, 2019b). Next day, in a fire fight 
between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, the latter lost a jet while the former’s pilot 
ejected into Pakistani territory. For a while it seemed that the simmering conflict between the 
nuclear-armed neighbours would escalate into a full-scale war (BBC, February 27, 2019c). 
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The BJP-led NDA national government, which had suffered serious reversals in the state 
elections in December 2018, and was facing the prospects of a defeat in the Lok Sabha 
elections in May 2019 (Safi 2018), wasted no effort in fanning the flames of jingoistic 
nationalism. In retrospect, the Pulwama attack might well become a major landmark in 
India’s post-1947 development. The incident itself was highly symbolic of the BJP’s 
governance in the last five years; it may well be a portent of the things to come. 
 
 Under the BJP, the efforts to project India’s power abroad have been accompanied by 
a new national narrative at home. These changes are reflected in three related areas: the 
attempts to redefine the public space, policies on religious minorities, and the control of state 
institutions. 
 
 The Hindu nationalist project as conceived by its founders in the 1920s aims to create 
a Hindu state in which there is a congruence between the main cultural force in Indian society 
and political power (Jaffrelot 1996). Since the 1980s, this objective has become sublimated in 
policies aimed at building a temple to Ram in place of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, 
abrogating article 370 of the constitution which gives special status to Jammu and Kashmir, 
and the creation of a uniform civil code that would repeal Muslim Personal Law. Whereas 
previous BJP-led NDA governments have preferred to put these policies on the backburner, 
in preference to the promotion of cultural nationalism (Adeney and Sáez 2005), under Modi 
there has been a distinct shift to redefining the public sphere in the language of Hindu 
nationalism. In contradistinction to Nehruvian secularism, the icon of the contemporary BJP 
is Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whose Statute of Unity was inaugurated by Modi in October 
2018.  The statute symbolises the yearning for power, strength and national unity. These 
norms have been taken further by the Modi government by seeking to control dissent. 
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Feminists, radicals, writers, intellectuals, social activists, and human rights campaigners who 
have opposed government policies have been marginalised or physically attacked. Directly or 
indirectly, the government has used its influence in the media, particularly the burgeoning 
digital media, to unleash a tidal wave of sectarian Hindu nationalism as the official state 
ideology in which opponents are regularly labelled as anti-national.  Sedition laws have been 
used against women, students and political activists. Street activists of the Sangh parivar - the 
family of Hindutva organisations that include the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the 
Vishva Hindu Parshad (VHP), Bajrang Dal (BD), Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad 
(ABVP) and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), and a large assortment of vigilante groups 
- have been regularly employed to discipline opponents, often resulting in physical 
confrontations or death.  As the 2019 World Press Freedom  
Index notes: 
Those who espouse Hindutva, the ideology that gave rise to Hindu nationalism, are 
trying to purge all manifestations of “anti-national” thought from the national debate. 
The coordinated hate campaigns waged on social networks against journalists who 
dare to speak or write about subjects that aggravate Hindutva followers are alarming 
and include calls for the journalists concerned to be murdered (Reporter with Borders 
2018).  
 
Concerted efforts have also been made to redefine citizenship by restricting the right to 
Indian citizenship to migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh to non-Muslims 
only. A bill proposing this change failed only because the BJP was unable to secure a 
majority in the upper house (BBC, February 13, 2019a). State institutions, too, have been 
used to foster crude jingoism. In 2014, the annual address of the RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat, 
was broadcast live on the nation tv network Doordarshan; and in October 2016, the 
University Grant’s Committee in an official circular asked affiliated universities and colleges 
to take a security pledge on the birth anniversary of Patel to commit themselves to “preserved 
the unity, integrity and security of the nation” in presence of freedom fighter who would 
speak about nationalism. (The Tribune, October 21, 2016).  This initiative came 
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simultaneously with the government’s attempt to make it compulsory to play the national 
anthem in every cinema before a film is screened; and though this decision was overturned by 
the Supreme Court, it created an atmosphere of collective vigilantism against cinema goers 
who did not follow the ruling.  
 
 In seeking to redefine the public sphere as a non-secular space of majoritarian 
nationalism, the BJP and its ideologues argue that they are acting within the spirit of the 
constitution.   So far, the initiatives taken by  the government to dilute article 370, Muslim 
Personal Law, and build a temple Ram on the site of the Babri Masjid, are clearly within the 
framework of the constitution but the policy outcomes which are being sought conform 
distinctively to the Hindutva agenda.  Even the most cardinal feature of the constitution, its 
state secularism, in the logical of Hindu nationalism, is being redefined from being “pseudo-
secular” (catering for religious minorities) to “genuine secularism” (reflecting the will of the 
majority).  Gradually, but ineluctably a new Hindutva republic is emerging in which there are 
no profound constitutional changes but where “political processes” have “already begun to 
change” (The Times of India, July 27, 2014). 
 
 The principal antagonistic “other” of Hindu nationalism have been the religious 
minorities – Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and Zoroastrians – against whom 
the ideology of an ethnised nation has been constructed.  Traditionally, in making a 
distinction between religious minorities (Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs), for whom India is a 
“holyland” and a “fatherland,” and others (Christians and Muslims), Hindu nationalists have 
sought to “assimilate the former within the broader pantheon of Hinduism and politically and 
socially exclude the latter as alien to India” (Kim 2017, 358). This strategy has been applied 
with vigour in the BJP government’s policies towards minorities since 2014. Funding for 
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minority development programmes has been significantly curtailed; policy initiatives 
undertaken by the previous United Progressive Alliance  (UPA) government to enhance 
equality and equity, especially for Muslims, in service delivery have been dropped; socio-
economically disadvantaged Christian and Muslim communities have been deliberately 
excluded from affirmative action while such provision has been extended to include “poor” 
upper castes;  and measures have been taken to restore  the legislative protection for 
scheduled castes and tribes against violence – in contrast to the denial of any equivalent 
protection to religious minorities, especially Muslims (Ibid; Kim 2019, 193). And these 
policies have been pursued in an atmosphere of hostility, often emanating from the 
government itself.  The Minster of Minority Affairs openly declared that “the Muslims are 
not a minority” (The Times of India, May 28, 2014a) and that the community’s concerns 
about security arose largely from a “fear psychosis” (Hebbar 2014) that had gripped India’s 
Muslims. Similarly, the Secretary of the BJP’S Scheduled Caste Cell urged poor Christians 
and Muslims to “convert back to Hinduism” (Singh 2016) if the wanted the benefits of 
reservations.  
 
 A far more debilitating impact on India’s religious minorities, particularly Muslims, 
has resulted from the campaigns orchestrated by the BJP’s mass organisations. Love Jihad 
(Strohl 2018) was launched in Uttar Pradesh before the 2014 general elections and captured 
the national imagination as a struggle against sexually rapacious Muslim youth converting 
Hindu women to Islam through false declarations of love. Orchestrated by Yogi Adityanath, 
who subsequently became the state’s Chief Minister in 2017 in a clean sweep of the state’s 
elections, the campaign demonised inter-religious marriages, framing them as an affront to 
traditional notions of patriarchy, family and the community. Ghar wapsi (return 
home/religious reconversion)  emerged soon after the election of the BJP government to 
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reconvert Christians and Muslims to Hinduism, often with inducements such as ration cards 
for access to state goods (Kim 2017, 363). It quickly spiralled into a debate about the need for 
national anti-conversion legislation to reinforce the highly restrictive freedom of religion 
legislation passed by many BJP state governments.  Similarly, soon after the elections, the 
gau raksha (cow protection) to prohibit the laughter of cows and processing of associated 
products also gripped the media’s attention. Vigilante groups became active in seeking to 
impose a cow slaughter ban, leading to many cases of public lynching of cow traders and 
those dealing with meat products. In attempting to assuage the growing popular influence of 
gau raksha campaigners, the government enacted the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(Regulation of Livestock Market) Rules, 2017, which banned the “sale and purchase of cattle, 
including cows and buffalos, for slaughter at live stock markets” (Ibid, 362) - a regulation 
which the critics of the government claimed was an underhand manoeuvre to impose national 
cow slaughter ban.    
 
 These campaigns were often accompanied by increasing levels of violence against 
religious minorities where the BJP faced state elections – Delhi, Haryana, UP.  Incidence of 
communal violence and attendant deaths increased annually since 2014 in both BJP and non-
BJP governed states, though there are some indications that in the latter, before elections, BJP 
activists had an incentive to foment communal violence (Kronstadt 2018).  As the Human 
Rights Watch (2018) report on India noted, “Vigilante violence aimed at religious minorities, 
marginalised communities, and critics of the government – often carried out by groups 
claiming to support the  ruling BJP – became an increasing threat in India in 2017.” But 
perhaps the major site of anti-minority violence was Kashmir where the government’s hard-
line policy instigated the current insurgency and the series of events which led to the 
Pulwama incident (UNHCHR 2018).  
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 Furthermore, despite formidable opposition the BJP government has begun to erode 
the architecture of minority and special regional rights embodied in the constitution.  An 
attempt has been made to amend Muslim Personal Law with prohibition of triple talaq; and 
the Law Commission was instructed to review the proposal for a Uniform Civil Code as part 
of its wider consultations of changes to minority personal law. Article 35A of the 
Constitution, which gives the residents of Kashmir special protection in terms of government 
employment, service delivery and land procurement, is currently under review in the 
Supreme Court. Minority institutions – religious organisations, trusts, educational 
establishments – have increasingly become the subject of control, infiltration and new 
regulations.  Religious minorities in India today, as the US Commission on Religious 
Freedom (2018) concludes in its Annual Report 2018, “face challenges ranging from acts of 
violence or intimidation, to loss of political power, to increasing feeling of 
disenfranchisement and ‘otherness.’”  These findings were echoed by Amnesty International, 
which in a wide-ranging report on human rights, religious freedom, freedom and government 
inaction, summarised that:  
Religious minority groups, particularly Muslims, faced increasing 
demonization by hard-line Hindu groups, pro-government media and some 
state officials…Authorities were openly critical of human rights defenders and 
organizations, contributing to a climate of hostility against them. Mob 
violence intensified, including by vigilante cow protection groups. Press 
freedom and free speech in universities came under attack. India failed to 
respect its human rights commitments made before the UN Human Rights 
Council. The Supreme Court and High Courts delivered several progressive 
judgments, but some rulings undermined human rights. Impunity for human 
rights abuses persisted (2018, 189). 
 
The indifference of the government to such transgressions led Ganguly (2015) to suggest that 
“it may well be seeking to usher in a new social order – one that privileges India’s dominant 




 At the core the BJP’s transformational project is a desire to remould state institutions 
in the image of Hindu nationalism. Government funded schemes have been renamed in 
celebration of Hindutva icons; education policy, notably at the state level in BJP governed 
states, has been used to revise the curricula, textbooks and extra-curricular activities to 
inculcate a sense of Hindu nationalist pride; and state ceremonial functions have been 
saturated with Hindu icons and language to undermine, if not erase, any pretence of 
representation of a plural, secular polity.   Although the BJP has been thwarted from fully 
Hindutvising  the state and the constitution by the absence of a majority in the upper house 
and an overwhelming majority in the lower house of parliament, this has not frustrated its 
efforts to use executive power to subvert or control the independent institutions of the state. 
The Supreme Court, for instance, witnessed an unprecedented struggle between the Chief 
Justice of India, who was alleged to be doing the government’s bidding and four court judges 
over the allocation of political sensitive cases which it was alleged the Chief Justice was 
withholding from his colleagues (Vanaik 2018). The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 
which had been used to investigate and harass political opponents, became politicised to such 
an extent that its two leading officers fought an open contest against each other in the courts 
(Bhardwaj 2018). The Election Commission, a body noted for its independence, was leaned 
upon to delay the calling of state elections in Gujarat, used to hurriedly disqualify Aam 
Aadmi Party Members of the Legislative Assembly for holding offices for profit, and justify 
the creation of election bonds as a source of funding for political parties (Varma 2018).  
Similarly, the independence and the regulatory functions of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
have been systematically undermined, not least in the pursuit of erratic polices such as 
demonetisations and the use of the RBI’s reserves to bolster the government’s own balance 
sheet. The Central Vigilance Commission, which oversees the CBI and central 
administration, was headed by a BJP loyalist with accusations of involvement in high profile 
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corruption cases himself (Ibid.).  University governing bodies and other academic 
institutions, traditionally the bastions of dissent and radicalism, including  Jawaharlal Nehru 
University(JNU), have been packed with BJP/RSS ideologues with a clear objective to 
reshape the objectives of institutions of higher education within the framework of the 
government’s values (Gudavarthy 2018, 27-32).   
  
These efforts to control independent state institutions that play a vital role in 
upholding impartiality reflect a desire to limit, if not erase, autonomous institutions and 
spaces. If in the past the appeal of Hindu nationalism was rooted primarily in the sphere of 
culture, since 2014 the BJP has ensured that in constructing a polity in its own image, the 
power of the state is fully utilised to both consolidate the process and marginalise its 
opponents. Thus, in making a broader sense of this development, of Hindu nationalism in 
power, instead of focusing on the gap between the party’s manifesto and its achievements, a 
more relevant exercise is to offer interpretative analyses of how the experience can be better 
understood. It is to these competing explanations that we now turn.   
 
Authoritarian populism 
Comparatively, the rise of the BJP and Modi share many of characteristics common to the 
success of populist leaders and parties in the United States, Europe, Latin America and East 
Asia. The new style and rhetoric with its emphasis on development, the corrupt ruling 
establishment, and the charismatic Modi who had “transformed” Gujarat, were all redolent of 
the populist wave (Chacko 2018). Populism according Norris and Inglehart is distinguished 
by two qualities: a rhetoric of opposition to established ideas, institutions and values which 
challenge legitimate authority, “disrupting mainstream ‘politics as usual’, and populist 
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“leaders claim that only legitimate source of political and moral authority rests with the 
‘people”’ (2019, 4-5) - the authentic, genuine and ultimate repositories of the collective will. 
Historically, populists have emerged both from  within the ideologies of the Left and the 
Right, but the term authoritarian populism was coined by the sociologist Stuart Hall (1985) to 
describe the politics of Thatcherism in the 1980s Britain to highlight the contradiction 
between the common people and the state as justification for policies against racialised and 
radical “other” minorities.  As Norris and Inglehart (Ibid.,8) point out, populist rhetoric, more 
of often than not, is combined with authoritarian values – in the name of the family, 
community and nation –  with group conformity and obedience to a strong leader to produce 
policies that target the threatening “others”  (migrants, alleged terrorists, non-conformists, 
and political opponents). 
 
 Populism as a political phenomenon is not alien to India. Mrs Indira Gandhi’s 
leftward turn in 1971 (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 135-148) under the slogan garibi hatao 
(eradicate poverty), which ended in the Emergency, was the first national experiment in non-
institutionalised politics. At the regional level (Wyatt 2013), state leaders have emerged who 
turned populism into an art form. The current brand of authoritarian populism, however, has 
its origins in Gujarat in the 1980s and 1990s where, as Desai (2011) notes, the caste and caste 
structure of the state combined with rapid capitalist development to produce new propertied 
groups under Hindutva, even though this dispensation now rests on extreme social 
polarisation. Writing in 2011, Desai inferred that “Gujarat could well be the image of India’s 




Since 2014, many of the BJP-led NDA’s policies – anti-immigration, anti-minorities, 
cow protection, anti-corruption crusade, surgical strikes (2016 and 2019) against terrorist 
bases in Pakistan, and the official promotion of jingoistic nationalism – and executive 
practices, that include extreme centralisation of power in the Prime Minister, suggest that 
authoritarian populism is an appropriate epithet for the administration. However, there are 
three distinct limitations in using this perspective. First, each authoritarian populism is in a 
sense sui generis, constrained and limited by the structure of governance. If India’s 
majoritarian political systems makes it easy prey for a dominant ideological party, then the 
country’s regional and social diversity also militates heavily against political coalitions being 
able to provide stability to such a regime. Second, as a catch-all the concept reflects poorly on 
the highly virulent form of nationalism advocated by the proponents of Hindutva, some of it 
with potentially genocidal tendencies. Again, to paraphrase Desai, if in the last decade 
Gujarat were the image of India’s future, then that future is being planned and perfected 
today with possibly devastating consequences. Third, the nature of governance in Delhi and 
within the states is rapidly evolving today. New information and social media technologies 
provide those in administration, as the implementation of aadhaar card scheme has 
demonstrated,ii with expanded spheres of political and social control to manage security and 
the distribution of collective social goods. Authoritarian populism thus fails to fully reflect 
the hardening of political control because these technologies and their use – and misuse – is 
suggestive of a more directly managed polity; and such direct control is more commonly 
associated with totalitarian states than a democracy suffering from a temporary aberration 






The Indian ideology 
Another perspective on the rise of the BJP and its government can be clustered around what 
Anderson has called the Indian ideology, a “discourse that fatally generates euphemisms and 
embellishments” (2013, 3) about the nature of India’s republic. This ideology is deeply 
embedded in modern Indian history and political science. Being largely a-historical, it rests 
on a binary distinction between secular and Hindu nationalism, ignoring the causes and 
consequences of the Partition (Talbot and Singh 2008). Whereas the Congress is portrayed as 
the harbinger of secular, inclusive and civilizational nationalism, Hindu nationalism is 
labelled as exclusive, majoritarian and a modern derivative ethno-national construct (see 
Varshney 2002, ch.3). In operationalising this distinction, the rise of the BJP is frequently 
attributed to proximate factors: the decay of the Congress party; its inability to deliver 
development; the agitational strategies of the Hindu nationalists; and Modi’s charismatic 
appeal, especially to the young electorate. Thus, following the 2014 elections, Varshney 
(2014) argued that Hindu nationalism’s revolutionary impulses would be constrained because 
they would damage the party’s programme of economic development, face opposition from 
coalition allies, and be invalidated by the constitution. A similar argument was made by 
Wright  for whom the rise of an ideologically centre-of-right party nationally offers an 
opportunity to create a “new zone of consensus” which can be extended to “incorporate the 
right wing, as the left wing was incorporated much earlier in Kerala and West Bengal” (2014, 
6).   In both case it was suggested that India’s democracy and constitution would act as 
moderating influence on Hindu nationalism.  
 
 Chacko and Mayer (2014), though more critical than Varshney or Wright, have posed 
the issue somewhat differently.  For them, the BJP’s success in the 2014 elections and its 
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ability to impose its transformative project, needed to fulfil two conditions: to push through 
an ideologically distinctive programme that serves the interests of its core constituency and, 
quoting Weatherford, convert “the votes that delivered victory to the party from a tenuous to 
a contingent social coalition united by rejection of the incumbent, to a support base that has 
substantial reasons for investing their loyalty in the party” (2002, 526). Hence, though the 
BJP came to power on a wave of anti-corruption and the promise of development, to become 
the new ruling dispensation it had to consolidate its governing formula through a distinctive 
ideology – development or Hindu nationalism, or a combination of both – that appeal to a 
wider social base than hitherto. 
 
 However, these analyses of the BJP in power have struggled to provide a reasonable 
account of the government’s policies and actions in the last five years. The BJP has been able 
to implement most of its policies within the framework of the constitution which is not a clear 
or unambiguous document. It is, as the BJP in power has demonstrated over Article 35A, 
Muslim Personal Law reform, and article 356 and cow protection, susceptible to a Hindutva 
reading. Equally, the political and economic factors that might have tempered the more 
belligerent policies have proved ineffective with neither the NDA’s coalition partners, nor 
considerations of economic policy, being a constraint on hostility towards religious 
minorities.  Clearly, a form of consolidation of the Hindutva constituency has taken place as a 
result of the government’s policies, and might be further reinforced by the outcome of the 
Lok Sabha elections.  If this is, indeed the case, the outcome has been delivered by de-
institutionalisation and cultural mobilisation rather than by working through the formal 




 The principal problem with explanations framed within the Indian ideology is that 
they overlook the historical modularity between the Congress and Hindu nationalism (Singh 
2000), a modularity that enabled the Congress to encapsulate the latter and marginalise its 
more extreme variants – for example the RSS and Jana Sangh- as an anathema to its official 
secularism. It was because of this modularity that the Congress could be a secular, 
developmental organisation but also as a party which under Mrs Gandhi persecuted 
minorities. This long-term ideological comprise, with many shades of soft Hindutva nestling 
in the party, have frustrated its efforts to be the rightful guardian of India’s religious 
minorities. Hence, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (2004-14), despite being 
committed to a radical programme of equal opportunities for religious, with the specific 
target of eradicating persistent socio-economic backwardness among the country’s Muslims 
minorities, quickly retreated from its programme, not least because of imbedded opposition 
within its own ranks (Kim 2019, ch.3),. Historically, a Congress-led coalition of secular 
parties has struggled to reverse many of the measures implemented by the BJP in office, 
notably that appeal to the cultural chauvinism of the majority (Sáez and Singh 2012). If 
anything, in office the BJP has succeeded in shifting the ideological centre of Indian politics 
permanently to the right, and other parties, like the Congress, have by perforce had to tip-toe 
on it. In the short run this may well be a tactical necessity; in the long run however it is 
unlikely to deliver a strategic dividend. 
 
Ethnic consolidation 
 In contrast to the pervasiveness of the Indian ideology in mainstream political science and 
history, a radically different set of explanations focus on understanding the political processes 
of ethnic consolidation. These explanations draw on democratic and institutional theory to 
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problematise the nature of the Partition settlement and how it perpetuates an inbuilt bias 
towards Hindu majoritarianism. Here the emergence of the BJP as the party of government is 
not conjectural but the product of long-term structural processes. 
  
 For these scholars (Singh 2000, ch.3), Indian democracy does not conform to a 
secularised majoritarianism in which the state (e.g. USA) encourages acculturalisation and 
assimilation but allows ethnic groups to maintain ethnicity in the private sphere. Nor does it 
resemble consociationalism, in which ethnicity and individual rights are recognised as the 
basis for the organisation of the state (e.g. Belgium) that acts as an arbiter between ethnic 
groups. Instead India appears to conform to a third variant; namely, “ethnic democracy”. As 
Smooha  maintains, ethnic democracies combine the “extension of political and civil rights to 
individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutionalised dominance over 
the state by one of the ethnic groups” (1990, 391)  In some ethnic democracies (e.g. Israel) 
the process of institutionalisation of dominance is formal, while in other (e.g. India) it is 
implicit. In India this arises from the unspoken assumptions of state secularism, the existence 
of Hindu majoritarianism, and the historic ascendency of the Congress in shaping the state in 
its own image. Although religious minorities have been granted individual and collective 
rights, the recognition of these rights has been based on a tactical accommodation with 
hegemonic Hinduism. According to Singh (2000, 47-50), within India’s framework of ethnic 
democracy, religious minorities have been subject to hegemonic and violent control, 
especially in the peripheral regions (Kashmir, Punjab, the North-east) where religious 
minorities constitute the majority of the population. Where religious and ethnic groups have 
disputed the nature of hegemonic control, the Indian state has used the ideological, economic 
and political resources at its disposal to make such contests “unthinkable” and used coercive 
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practices to render them “unworkable” (Ibid., 47). In sum, the experience of India’s religious 
and ethnic minorities is not one of equality in a secular, plural democracy. 
 
 Whereas the proponents of “ethnic democracy” highlight the structures and 
experience of Indian democracy since 1947, for institutionalists (Kim 2019) historical 
institutionalism and path dependence provide a more fruitful point of departure in 
understanding state policies towards religious minorities. This concept holds that institutions 
created during “critical junctures” – major turning points in history – can have long-term 
outcomes which are difficult to reverse because they create “increasing returns” to 
constituencies that support them (Peters 2005). India’s period of constitution-making was one 
such critical juncture. Acknowledging the precepts of high modernity in fashioning a secular 
state, this period also created an uneven playing field between the Hindu majority and India’s 
religious minorities by seriously curtailing the political claims minorities could make in the 
name of their religious identity. It also restricted major affirmative action provisions solely to 
disadvantaged Hindu lower castes (Kim 2019, 39-45). While the modularity between the 
ideology of the secular state and majority Hindu national sentiment politically disarmed 
religious minorities, the restriction of affirmative action to only disadvantaged Hindu lower 
caste groups profoundly impacted on the development of Indian democracy. In the long-term, 
the exclusion of Christians and Muslims from these provisions has created an enduring social 
divide. In short, the historical institutionalist approach draws attention to how the framing of 
religion by India’s constitution-makers did not so much as erase the claims of religion in 




 The concepts of an “ethnic democracy” and historical institutionalism and path 
dependence have some merit in explaining the rise of the BJP and its performance in 
government. They highlight the pervasive bias in public policy against religious minorities 
since 1947.  They also provide an invaluable framework for situating the BJP’s policies on 
Kashmir, citizenship, religious minorities, and the efforts to build a Hindu state, though 
analyst disagree on whether an “ethnic democracy” is being crafted or consolidated (Jaffrelot 
2017; Singh 2000). Similarly, historical institutionalism and path dependence provide a good 
account of the efforts of the BJP and its family of organisation to broaden its support base to 
caste groups (Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Schedule Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes 
(STs)) traditionally viewed as hostile to Hindu nationalism. These policies have included the 
granting of constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes, the 
restoration of special protection for SCs against violence, and most recently, reservations for 
poor upper castes (Vanaik 2018).  Such initiatives contrast vividly with policy inertia and 
indifference to the poverty among socio-economically disadvantaged lower castes among 
Christians and Muslims. This deliberate neglect is perhaps reflective of the maturing of what 
Anderson has called a “caste-iron” democracy (2013:112). 
 
 The application of an ethnic democracy to understand of the rise of the BJP and its 
policies have been critiqued on several grounds. First, it is said to constructs the idea of a 
dominant, homogenous Hindu community where one simply does not exist because of the 
manifold divisions within Hinduism (Adeney 2017). Second, the rights of minorities in India 
are not nominal but have provided substantive collective and individual relief; and though 
India might meet most of the conditions necessary for the establishment of an ethnic 
democracy, its de jure transformation remains still quite problematic because of the political 
threshold necessary to revise the constitution. 
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 Similarly, historical institutionalism and path dependence as a framework for 
understanding the predicament of India’s religious minorities can be criticised for being too 
general and indiscriminate.  Across India the sociological development of religious minorities 
varies enormously between communities and regions, so that framing it in a straight-jacket of 
path dependence seems highly problematic. Although public policies on Muslims at the 
national level, notably under the BJP, might provide strong confirmatory evidence of a policy 
lock that is irreversible, this is evidently not the case in the southern states (Fazael 2010) 
where Muslims have been included in reservations before and after Independence.  There are, 
moreover, serious conceptual and empirical difficulties with historical institutionalism and 
path dependence – the nature of “critical junctures”, change between such junctures, and  the 
idea of “increasing returns” over time (Mahoney 2000) - which do not lend themselves 
readily to the operationalisation of the approach in India.  
    
Marxist approaches 
Inevitably, the most trenchant critiques of the BJP government have come from Marxists. 
Historically, India has a rich radical tradition associated with the Communist Party of India 
(CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)), and the many of the groupuscules 
of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)). Whereas the first two have 
eschewed direct action since early Independence, the latter (Sundar 2019) continue to wage 
an insurgency against the Indian state. In central-eastern parts of the country, large swathes 
are affected by a Maoist uprising which the security forces have struggled to contain. As well 
as political Marxism, Western Marxism continues to offer a timely appraisal of developments 
in India, including of the country’s diverse and incoherent communist movement itself. 
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 Central to Marxist analysis are the contradictions between the economy managed by 
the state and the social formations. It is impossible to do justice to the debates among Marxist 
on the nature of these contradictions and the political implications that arise from them. Here 
we reflect on some of the core analysis and the politics of the Left in India. 
 
 Naturally, for Marxists the starting point is the economic policies of the government 
since 2014 that have accentuated the drive towards a neo-liberal economy. They include the 
deliberate degradation of agriculture through the reduction in subsides,  declining 
procurement prices and rising chronic indebtedness; systematic reduction in rural anti-
poverty programmes for the landless; removal of protection rights for organised labour; the 
creation of new Special Economic Zones; further liberalisation of areas of inward investment; 
new legislation for the acquisition of agricultural land for infrastructural and industrial 
development; use of the financial system to support the country’s major corporations; and the 
promotion of “crony capitalism” in nurturing a close relationship between some leading 
corporations and the administration (Chacko 2018). When set alongside the political 
developments outlined above,  these measures have led some to question whether the BJP 
government should be seen as marking the onset of fascism or reflects a version of 
authoritarianism. For S. Banaji, what we are witnessing is an “indigenised version of 
fascism” with its “fetishisation of Muslims as a worthy enemy” and subversion of 
“democratic processes under the guise of democracy” (2018, 45).  This view is supported by 
J. Banaji (2016), who maintains that there are remarkable similarities -an ideological base, 
social mobilisation, the complicity of state authorities in accommodating the Hindu Right, 
and the use of “stormtroopers” to discipline opponents - between the rise of fascism in 1930s 
Germany and India today. But such a reading was not shared by the former general sectary of 
the CPI (M). For him conditions under the BJP government did not meet the classical 
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definition of   fascism by Marxist; namely, an “open terrorist dictatorship of the most 
reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital” (Karat 2016). 
Rather, it was not “fascist” but “authoritarian”, a characterisation that enabled the CPI (M) to 
maintain its parliamentary strategy. 
 
 Marxist accounts also highlight the changing nature of the state under the BJP. 
Although there are subtle differences on the extent to which the government’s policies 
represent accommodation with the global neo-liberal agenda, there is a consensus that a new 
developmental state is emerging, one in line with the East Asian model in which 
authoritarianism is combined with capitalist-state led development. This  model is identified 
with Modi’s tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat when he followed policies that “promised 
private sector driven growth, high economic growth rates, business friendly policies, foreign 
investment, urbanisation and industrial development” (Chacko 2018, 554). But the outcome 
of these policies – in Gujarat and India since 2014 – has been to produce extreme social 
polarisation, unbalanced development, and authoritarian governance that has sought to 
emasculate democratic opposition. Hyper nationalism is one response to bridging the gap 
between policies and the reality. 
 
 For other Marxists, though the government’s economic policies are important, the 
performance of the BJP government should be viewed through the lens of Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony. Vanaik (2018), operating substantially within the framework of the Indian 
ideology, makes a sharp distinction between India’s two hegemonies: that of the Congress 
and the BJP.  The emergence of the BJP as a hegemonic force has been part of the longue 
durée characterised by the decline of the Congress, failure of its economic development, the 
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BJP’s efforts to extend its social base among new social classes and castes, and a slow but 
perceptible change in social values of India’s middle class towards religious conservatism. 
The BJP’s actions in office, especially in the use of state power to promote Hindu cultural 
chauvinism, is symptomatic of a process to consolidate a new vision of neo-liberal vision of 
India.  As Vanaik concludes, the new “hegemony of the BJP represents a qualitative 
hardening of Indian political culture. A decisive defeat of this powerful far-right bloc, so 
deeply engrained in the pores of Indian society, will require a major shift in the socio-
political relationship of forces” (2018, 59).   
 
 Apart from the general concerns of applying Marxist approaches, there are three 
specific issues in their understanding of BJP-led NDA government. First, economic 
liberalisations began in the early 1980s. While the rise of the BJP was coterminous with this 
liberalisation, it is difficult to identify as its primary cause. In fact, Congress governments, 
despite their social welfare programmes, have continued the process of economic 
liberalisation. Second, it is doubtful whether a concept such as fascism is historically 
applicable to India, even though there are family similarities. The genealogy of Hindutva is 
contemporaneous with the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, but the historical specificity 
of the ideology was entirely different (Jaffrelot 1999). And third, though Marxist accounts 
capture well the process of transition in development that is taking place in India, the end 
point of this process (e.g. a Hindutva developmental state) remains largely unclear.  The 
question is whether the BJP and Hindutva are a by-product of a transitional regime - that aims 
to fully integrate the Indian economy into the world capitalist system - or its principal driver. 




Towards an alternative approach? 
Given the significant shortcomings of the approaches outlined above, there is a need to move 
beyond them to develop a more satisfactory method for analysing Hindu nationalism in 
power. Authoritarian populism reflects the incoherence, anti-liberalism, and the wider appeal 
of the BJP and its leadership, but the general sociological changes that underpin the rise of 
the Hindutva ideology are given insufficient recognition. Among these changes (see  
Gudavarthy 2018) are the long-term consequences of economic liberalisation since the early 
1980s; the pervasive sense of anomie among propertied and subaltern groups alike; the 
increasingly fragmented social identities of caste, gender, social class and religion that have 
created new alignments challenging traditional stereotypes; the emergence of a powerful 
globalised,  middle class that reflects the anxieties and ambitions of Hindutva; and, above all, 
the impact of the digital revolution on social change as well as political and every day 
communications in creating new narratives of Indian politics both at the national and regional 
levels. Taken together they may well be the evidence of the emergence of a mass society that 
some analyst predicted almost three decades ago (Jeffrey 1986). However, whereas in Europe 
in some countries mass societies at the end of the nineteenth centuries presaged the rise of 
fascism, in India today the process appears to be much more variegated, diffuse and 
unpredictable.   
 
 It is also a moot point whether the emergence of Hindutva as the new hegemonic 
ideology that is displacing Nehruvian secularism is a form of cultural subalternalism 
(Gudavarthy 2018, xxiii). This subalternity might well be spearheading a cultural 
democratisation from below led by Modi himself who, as a member of the OBCs, is only too 
keen to exploit his anti-establishment credentials. But if the process is being consciously 
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engineered by the BJP, RSS and its family of organisations dominated by the upper castes, its 
popular appeal can only be understood as the final alignment of state power with the main 
cultural force in Indian society: Hinduism . Under the Congress governments this embrace 
was always partial; under the BJP it now become the raison d’être of the state.  
 
 Any alternative approach needs to keep three considerations in mind. First, as 
institutionalists have insisted, history and continuity must be placed at the centre of such 
analysis. The rise of the BJP to a party of government, for instance, was not some dramatic 
event propelled by the collapse of Congress or the charisma of Modi: it was predicated on 
institutional and ideological structures of post-partition India in which the Congress willingly 
accommodated a soft version of Hindutva within itself. A critical reading of the Congress’s 
post-Independence history illustrates the extent to which the party was both unwilling to 
address the uncomfortable questions about economic development but also the lengths to 
which it went to promote Hinduism as the country’s civic religion (Anderson 2013). 
Congress crafted the constitution though in doing so it created the institutional structures for 
its own demise. 
 
 Second, any approach must integrate the immense social changes noted above. In 
most explanations, these changes are often seen as the symptoms of the rise of Hindutva than 
its cause. A clear distinction needs to be made between the policies and the economic and 
social processes that underpin them. The BJP-led NDA government after 2014, for example, 
followed centralising and authoritarian policies, but this impulse was reinforced by new 
digital technologies of social and economic control where meta-data was used to control, 
discipline, regulated and punish recalcitrant social groups in the name of more effective 
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service delivery. In age of disciplined, digital capitalism and the meta-data state, the 
totalitarian temptation – as China’s new Social Credit programme illustrates - is never too far 
away. The key issue is whether the moves in this direction in India are being consciously 
planned or a simply the results of an incremental fusion between a radical ideology and new 
technologies. 
  
 Finally, some of these concerns can be better addressed by borrowing from social 
constructionism, an approach that focuses on the “the creation of social knowledge and 
reality through interaction” in which “social constructionism serves as a mode of explanation 
to indicate and measure ideational change” (Ogden 2012, 23). From this perspective, the BJP 
and other agents of Hindutva are enjoined in a conscious construction of new political and 
social identities in which state power is the handmaiden. However, this process began with 
the first BJP-led NDA government (1998-2004) – not 2014 - when these identities “were 
assertively established, entrenched and, in effect, mainstreamed into the topography of 
contemporary politics” (Ibid., 35). Indeed, this mainstreaming explains perhaps how these 
identities were so effectively mobilised and why they put up such firm resistance to the 
UPA’s programme to reform policies for religious minorities (Kim 2019, chs.2, 3). Social 
constructionism, moreover, with its transhistorical emphasis has analytical synergies with 
historical institutionalism (Mahoney 2000) which privileges the importance of long-term 
impact of embedded institutions and processes through the concept of path-dependence.   
 
Conclusion 
The hyper-nationalist campaign conducted by the BJP and its allies since the Palwama 
incident failed to convert into a landslide victory in the Lok Sabha elections held between 11th   
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April and 19th  May 2019. Palwama enabled the BJP to arrest the decline in its support, 
which in the autumn of 2018 had seemed terminal, but it did not provide a defining victory.  
In the event, the BJP secured xxx seats (down from xxx in 2014) and xx percentage of the 
vote polled (down xx from 2014). In addition, the party’s regional allies have secured xxx 
seats and xx percentage of the vote polled, a total which should enable the NDA to secure 
another five years in office. However, the BJP has suffered significant reversal in Uttar 
Pradesh, its bastion and ruled by its most hard-line regional leader. In the South, it and its 
allies have been virtually wiped out. The party’s representation is now concentrated in the 
West, the Hindi-belt and the North-east. 
  
Although the BJP has returned to power with a reduced majority, this is unlikely to 
dampen its ideological fervour because it has perfected the art of managing its regional 
partners while marginalising them in office. The latter’s emboldened status might temper this 
outlook, but given the previous experience of such allies, this outcome seems highly 
improbable. Interestingly, whether in Gujarat or New Delhi, Modi has never lost an election. 
He and the BJP are unlikely to relinquish power without a struggle. 
 
 Even if the new BJP-led NDA’s term in office is short-lived, the main political 
beneficiary from this outcome is likely to be the BJP itself. The Congress and its regional 
allies, as the experience of the UPA demonstrated, have struggled to de-Hindutvise the state.  
Ironically, a weak, unstable coalition led by the Congress, or other Opposition parties, might 
create the ideal conditions for the return of Modi as a strongman who can bring back order 
and stability. Out of the chaos of its own creation, Hindu nationalism has the potential for the 
long-term coronation of a strongman who, unbridled by constitutional checks, delivers the 
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social and economic transformation that has so eluded India since independence. In so doing, 
he would also mark the terminal decline of India’s democracy that analysts suggest is not 
unrelated to extended periods of authoritarian governance (Levitsky and Ziblat 2018). 
 
Lastly, as the analyses have indicated we are undoubtedly witnessing a major change 
in Indian politics. It is not unlike what some institutionalists call a “critical juncture” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 110-111) in which conventional political certainties are 
being recast in radical ways for the long-term. Remarkably, all the approaches discussed 
recognise that this change is on-going as well as being irreversible.  Such unanimity, 
therefore, calls for new mode of analysis, a framework that provides how the embrace of state 
power has changed and is changing Hindu nationalism today.  
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